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A Legal Basis for Non-Arbitrary Detention:  
Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence  
Jane M. Rooney 
Introduction 
 
The Court of Appeal decision of Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence1 has been 
described by government officials as yet another example of the misapplication of human rights 
on the battlefield and as further evidence of the fact that a new British Bill of Rights is required 
to prevent the application of human rights abroad.2  The decision found that the UK government 
was in violation of Article 5 right to liberty and security under the European Convention on 
Human Rights for the detention of a suspected Taliban Commander in Afghanistan for almost 
four months. It found that the detention of Serdar Mohammed had no legal basis in domestic 
law, international humanitarian law or under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1890 (2009).3 Furthermore, it found that because there was no legal basis in 
international humanitarian law for detention in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), 
international humanitarian law could not be taken into account in determining what constituted 
‘non-arbitrary’ detention for the purposes of Article 5.4 The Court suggested that in order for 
the UK government to avoid a violation of Article 5 the UK should legislate to provide for a 
legal basis in domestic law for detention beyond 96 hours.5 This solution has been met with 
approval by commentators.6 However, the fact that more than a legal basis and procedural 
                                                          
 Jane M. Rooney, University College, Durham University. Thanks to Henry Jones and Ruth Houghton for their 
suggestions. All errors remain my own. 
1 Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843.  
2 O. Bowcott, “British forces illegally detained Afghan suspect, court of appeal rules” (July 30, 2015), 
Guardian.co.uk, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jul/30/british-forces-illegally-detained-afghan-suspect-
court-of-appeal-rules [Accessed September 2, 2015]. 
3 See fn. 1 paras 125—253; UNSC Res 1890 ( 8 October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1890. 
4 above paras 123, 166, 281. 
5 above paras 10 (ii), 241, 363 (iv). 
6 M. Milanovic, “Some Thoughts on the Serdar Mohammed Appeals Judgment” (August 10, 2015), EJIL: Talk!, 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/some-thoughts-on-the-serdar-mohammed-appeals-judgment/ [Accessed September 2, 
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safeguards is required in order for the detention policy to be ‘non-arbitrary’ under Article 5 
demands further scrutiny.  
How can the UK government ensure that a detention policy provided for in UK legislation is 
‘non-arbitrary’ under Article 5? Will the legislation have to comply with the exhaustive list of 
circumstances under which detention is permitted under Article 5? Unlike the High Court, the 
Court of Appeal recognised that Article 5 could be interpreted to include other grounds of 
detention in armed conflict without derogation under Article 15 following from the Strasbourg 
decision in Hassan.7 It will be argued that in order to ensure that detention is ‘non-arbitrary’ 
international humanitarian law could be used to delimit the scope and content of Article 5 in 
NIACs despite the fact that it does not provide legal authorisation for detention in those 
circumstances.8 Alternatively, legislators could draw upon the most expert and inclusive policy 
reports on detention in NIACs. 9  The analysis seeks to suggest a viable solution for avoiding a 
violation of Article 5 in relation to detention in NIACs, but also highlights the fact that human 
rights do not hold the UK armed forces to untenable standards. Conversely, the Convention 
seeks to provide ways of modifying Article 5 to meet the practical difficulties that may be 
presented in armed conflict.  
  
                                                          
2015]; J. Horowitz, “The Reason Why the UK Lost the Serdar Mohammed Case” (August 3, 2015), Just Security, 
https://www.justsecurity.org/25184/reason-uk-lost-serdar-mohammed-case/ [Accessed September 2, 2015]. 
7 Hassan v United Kingdom App No. 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014); See fn. 1 paras 116–124.  
8 R. Goodman, “Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts”, (2015) 
91 Int’l L. Stud. 155, 159. 
9 G. Rona, “Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Detention Dilemma?” (2015) 91 Int’l L. Stud. 32, 58; 
E. Debuf, “Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-international Armed 
Conflict”, 91 IRRC 859 (2009). 
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Facts and Legal Issues 
The approach taken by Strasbourg and UK domestic courts to the extraterritorial application of 
the Convention has changed dramatically over the last five years. In 2011, the Strasbourg court 
confirmed that when a state agent exercises authority and control over an individual abroad, 
that individual falls within the “jurisdiction” of that state and the state’s obligations under the 
Convention are be triggered. 10 Previous precedent had provided that “jurisdiction” would be 
found only when the state exercised “effective control of the territory”, a much higher threshold 
of control required to trigger the application of the Convention.11  In 2013, the UK Supreme 
Court confirmed that it would follow the approach taken by the Strasbourg court, broadening 
the extraterritorial applicability of the Convention to include the “state agent authority and 
control” test. 12 It also went further than Strasbourg, insofar as it extended the protection of the 
Convention to UK soldiers abroad.  
The 2014 High Court decision of Serdar Mohammed addressed whether there was a legal basis 
for detention under international humanitarian law in NIACs abroad for the purposes of Article 
5.13 It also considered the relationship between international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law in determining the content and requirements of Article 5. Justice Leggatt 
found that international humanitarian law did not provide a legal basis under Article 5 for 
detention in NIACs.14 In determining the scope and content of Article 5, he found that because 
international humanitarian law did not provide authority to detain in a NIAC, that it could not 
be applied in the present case to determine the application of Article 5 in armed conflict.15 It 
will be demonstrated that the Court of Appeal engaged in a detailed analysis of whether there 
was a legal basis for the detention, particularly in relation to the most controversial purported 
legal basis, international humanitarian law. The analysis section will focus on how Hassan, a 
Strasbourg judgment delivered between the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions, altered 
the reasoning of the Court in relation to the application of international humanitarian law in 
                                                          
10 Al Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 para 133. 
11 Banković v Belgium ECHR 2001-XII 333. 
12 Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 69.   
13 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB). 
14 above para. 293. 
15 above para. 293.  
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non-international armed conflict, and will suggest ways to ensure legislation of ‘non-arbitrary’ 
detention for the purposes of Article 5.16  
Serdar Mohammed, believed to be – and later confirmed as - a senior Taliban Commander, was 
arrested and detained by UK armed forces from 7 April 2010 until 25 July 2010 in UK detention 
facilities in both Camp Bastion and Kandahar Airfield in Helmand Province, Afghanistan for 
the purpose of bringing him before an Afghan prosecutor or judge. A Minister at the UK 
Ministry of Defence approved his detention for beyond 96 hours as it appeared likely that 
questioning him would provide significant new intelligence. The Detention Review Committee 
at Camp Bastion intended to hand over Mohammed to the Afghan authorities from 4 May 2010 
but were prevented from doing so due to lack of capacity and overcrowding in the Afghan 
Directorate of National Security prison at Lashkar Gah. Mohammed was thereby held in Camp 
Bastion from 6 May for “logistical detention” until transfer to the Afghan authorities on 25 
July 2010.17 The UK had formulated its own detention policy, Standard Operating Instruction 
J3-9 (UK SOI J3-9), following a major redeployment of 3,500 UK troops to Helmand province 
between January and July 2006.18 Amendment 2 of UK SOI J3-9 was applicable when 
Mohammed was detained and provided for the extension of detention beyond 96 hours in 
“exceptional circumstances”.19 The criteria used in deciding whether there could be an 
extension were whether the extension would provide “significant new intelligence vital for 
force protection”, “significant new information on the nature of the insurgency”, and the 
“length of the extension required”.20  
Although a claim was brought under tort law, the principal claim made by Mohammed was a 
breach of Article 5 under the Convention. Following Al Skeini, the Court found that 
‘jurisdiction’ under Article 1 was established as state agent authority and control had been 
exercised over the individual during arrest and detention.21 The Court found that the detention 
was attributable to the UK and not to ISAF because UK forces had captured and detained 
Mohammed; Mohammed’s detention was authorised by a UK commander and reviewed within 
a UK chain of command; and the UK detention policy (UK SOI J3-9) was different in crucial 
                                                          
16 See fn. 7. 
17 See fn. 1 para. 43. 
18 above para. 40.  
19 above para. 265 citing Amendment 2 Part 2 para. 27. 
20 above para. 267 citing Amendment 2 Part 2 para. 27. 
21 See fn. 1 para. 99. 
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respects from ISAF’s detention policy (ISAF SOP 362).22 A breach of Article 5 would therefore 
be established unless it could be shown that there was a lawful power to detain which was not 
arbitrary and which was subject to the required procedural safeguards.23  
The Court did not find a legal basis to detain under the domestic law of Afghanistan, UNSCR 
1890 (2009) or under treaty and customary international humanitarian law for longer than 96 
hours.24   In relation to Afghan domestic law, expert statements provided that armed forces 
participating under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) could detain a suspected 
criminal for only up to 72 hours before handing them over to the police or prosecutor.25 In 
reasoning that UNSCR 1890 (2009) had granted authority to ISAF the Court found that it was 
for ISAF to determine the conditions under which forces could detain in Afghanistan under 
UNSCR 1890 (2009).26 This departed from the reasoning, although not the result, in the High 
Court decision. Justice Leggatt had found that there was no “clear and explicit” intention to 
diverge from human rights standards under the UNSCR and therefore that it had not provided 
for detention beyond 96 hours.27 
ISAF SOP 362 paragraph 5 held that detention was permitted for a “maximum of 96 hours” 
after which time the detainee had to be released or handed over to the Afghan authorities.28 The 
standards outlined within ISAF SOP 362 were the “minimum necessary to meet international 
norms”.29 While a detainee could be held for more than 96 hours to ensure her safety in release 
or transfer this exception did not constitute authority for longer term detention but rather 
operated to meet exigencies including “logistical” difficulties such as transport or weather 
conditions.30 There was no express authority in ISAF SOP 362 for allowing States to depart 
from those standards and the guidelines in the footnote to paragraph 5 ISAF SOP 362 set 96 
                                                          
22 above para 51.  
23 above para. 44. 
24 above para. 125. 
25 above paras 130—137. 
26 above para. 149. 
27 See fn. 13 para. 205 citing Al-Jedda v UK (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 23 para. 102. UNSCR 1890 (2009) stated that 
‘the Member States participating in [ISAF] to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate’. 
28 See fn. 1 para. 150. 
29 This appears in the footnote to para. 5 in ISAF SOP 362. 
30ISAF SOP 362 para. 8. 
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hours as the maximum time permitted for detention.31 The Court found that there was “no 
doubt” that UK SOI J3-9 went beyond that authorised under ISAF SOP 362 as it was only in 
very limited circumstances that detention could continue beyond 96 hours under the ISAF 
policy which the Court felt was not reflected under UK SOI J3-9.32  
The Court then examined whether international humanitarian law authorised detention in a 
NIAC. The conflict in Afghanistan was classified as a NIAC as it involved multinational forces 
fighting alongside the forces of the Afghan host State in its territory and with its consent against 
organised armed groups.33 The Court accepted the government’s labelling of the conflict in 
Afghanistan as an “internationalised” NIAC placing emphasis on the fact that not all the parties 
to the conflict were sovereign States.34  It found that detention in NIACs was not authorised by 
international humanitarian law treaty law or customary international law.  
The absence of a positive prohibition of non-arbitrary detention35 in international humanitarian 
law in a NIAC was insufficient legal authority to detain because although states were accorded 
a wide freedom of action in international law “the freedom [had to be] derived from a legal 
right and not from an assertion of unlimited will”.36 Secondly, the Court considered the 
government’s argument that there was implicit authority to detain in a NIAC derived from 
treaty law, specifically Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (Common Article 
3) and the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Conventions (APII). The government relied on 
express references to “detention” in Common Article 3 and in APII Articles 2, 4(1), 5(1) and 
(2) and 6 to those “deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons 
related to the conflict” and to “detention” and “internment”. The government argued that the 
premise of those references and the existence of rules in Common Article 3 and APII for the 
protection of those detained in a NIAC was that there was an inherent power to detain. 37 The 
                                                          
31 See fn. 1 para. 155. 
32 above para. 156.  
33 above para. 169. 
34 above para. 188, 194.  
35 above para. 196 citing J-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Volume I: Rules, (ICRC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), Rule 99: “Arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty is prohibited”.  
36 above para. 197 citing R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn (Oxford University 
Press, 1992) p.12. 
37 above para. 200. 
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Court followed the ICRC’s statement in an Opinion Paper that: “in the absence of specific 
provisions in Common Article 3 and [APII], additional authority related to the grounds for 
internment and the process to be followed needs to be obtained, in keeping with the principle 
of legality”. 38  The “additional authority” envisaged was an “international agreement between 
international forces and the host State, the adoption of the host State’s domestic law, or 
provisions for grounds and process in the standard operating procedures of the international 
forces”.39 Therefore, in the absence of explicit reference to the power to detain in Common 
Article 3 and APII, it was necessary for there to be another legal basis for detention, whether 
that be in an international agreement, the domestic law of the host state or in operational 
policies of the multinational force in order for detention not to be arbitrary. The Court also 
confirmed that the power to use lethal force against armed groups did not “logically 
encompass…operational detention”.40 The Court noted that this was only an a priori argument 
based on the structure of international humanitarian law rather than on the provisions of 
Common Article 3 and APII.41  
The Court noted three additional reasons for not implying a power into Common Article 3 and 
APII in a traditional NIAC. Firstly, in light of the number of different types of NIACS, it would 
be necessary to decide which of them qualified for the implication and no criteria were 
suggested by the government.42 Secondly, states had explicitly rejected an implied power to 
detain in Common Article 3 and APII because under the principles of equality, equivalence 
and reciprocity insurgents would have been entitled to detain captured members of the 
government’s army.43 Thirdly, finding an implied treaty basis for a detention would not 
overcome the problem of the lack of treaty guidance on the scope of such a power.44 
Having concluded that a power to detain could not be implied in treaty law, the Court then 
considered whether it could be implied in customary international law through state practice 
                                                          
38 above para. 202 citing ICRC, “Interment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Procedure” (Opinion Paper, 
November 2014), p. 8. 
39 above para. 204. 
40 above para. 204—207. 
41 above para. 208. 
42 above para. 215. 
43 above paras 216, 178—181.  
44 above paras 217—218.  
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and opinio juris, a belief that state practice amounted to law.45 The government argued that The 
Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations: 
Principles and Guidelines, labelled the Copenhagen Principles, was evidence of state practice 
as this process involved 24 States as participants and took over five years to complete.46 The 
government particularly relied on paragraph 3 of the preamble which stated that participants 
“recognised that detention is a necessary, lawful and legitimate means of achieving the 
objectives of international military operations”.47 However, the Court noted that the 
commentary to Principle 16 of the Copenhagen Principles stated those principles were not of a 
legally binding nature and “[could not] constitute a legal basis for detention”.48 The Court could 
also not see evidence of state practice that had relied on authority based on international 
humanitarian law to detain in an internationalised NIAC.49 It emphasised the prohibitory nature 
of international humanitarian law: its purpose was to provide protection for individuals against 
state force rather than to facilitate the deprivation of liberty of an individual.50 Contrary to 
submissions by the government, a power to detain was not reflected in the 2004 edition of the 
UK’s Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict51 and there were other documents 
that recorded views within the Ministry of Defence that there was no basis upon which UK 
forces could legitimately detain individuals in Afghanistan beyond 96 hours. Therefore there 
did not exist the belief that the detention was legally necessary to give rise to customary law. 
52  
The Court concluded that authorisation to detain in a NIAC could not be found in treaty or 
customary law of international humanitarian law but had to be found in the domestic law either 
                                                          
45 above para. 220. 
46 above para. 223 citing “The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines” (2012), http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-
and-diplomacy/Copenhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf [Accessed September 2, 
2015].  
47 above para. 224. 
48 above para. 226. 
49 above paras 228—230.  
50 above paras 241, 243.  
51 Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf 
[Accessed September 2, 2015].  
52 above para. 244. 
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of the State which detained or of the host State on which detention occurred.53 Following the 
decision of the High Court, it found that the detention was not in conformity with Strasbourg 
jurisprudence under Article 5.54  
Analysis 
 
The Court indicated that a legal basis could potentially be found in UNSCR 1890 (2009), 
international humanitarian law, domestic Afghan law or domestic UK legislation. Although a 
legal basis for detention could potentially be provided for by UNSCR55 or international 
humanitarian law,56 this could be difficult to achieve in practice due to the highly political 
nature of drafting UNSCRs and in reforming international humanitarian law. Furthermore, it 
may be difficult in practice to persuade Afghan authorities to amend their domestic laws in 
order to facilitate UK detention policies in Afghan territory. Providing a legal basis for 
detention through UK domestic legislation in NIACs has received support due to its 
achievability.57  The Court recommended legislation that either prevented claims from foreign 
nationals or which alternatively provided specific authority to detain in military operations 
abroad.58 Due to the fact that preventing foreign nationals from claiming would be 
discriminatory under human rights law, legislation providing specific authority to detain 
appears to be the most amenable option between the two.59   
While the Court provided guidance on how to establish a legal basis for detention, it did not 
address what standards should be used in ensuring ‘non-arbitrary’ detention under Article 5. 
Detention would still have to be ‘non-arbitrary’ as required under Article 5.60 Article 5 (1) (a)-
(f) provides an exhaustive list of non-arbitrary detention in peacetime61 which prohibits 
                                                          
53 above para. 241. 
54 above paras 272, 280–294. 
55 above para. 162.  
56 above para. 251. 
57 See fn. 2. 
58 paras. 10(ii) and 363(iv). 
59 See fn. 2.  
60 Saadi v United Kingdom App. No. 13229/03 (ECtHR, 29 January 2008) para. 68: Non-arbitrariness “extends 
beyond lack of conformity with national law”.  
61 Winterwerp v Netherlands A 33 (1979); 2 EHRR 387 para 39. 
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internment.62 In the High Court decision, a preliminary question arose as to whether Article 5 
would admit of any further categories of non-arbitrary detention that were not already 
designated in the exhaustive list.  Justice Leggatt in the High Court decision had expressed the 
opinion that in order to include internment in armed conflict as non-arbitrary in the exhaustive 
list, a derogation under Article 15 would be required.63 Whether or not an extraterritorial 
derogation was possible, and whether it was required for the application of Article 5 in armed 
conflict, was a matter of much contention.64 However, the Strasbourg court confirmed in 
Hassan that it was possible to provide grounds for non-arbitrary detention outside of the 
exhaustive list without derogating.65    
Hassan concerned the invasion of Iraq by a coalition of armed forces lead by the US in 2003 
and the detention of the brother of a high ranking commander of the Ba’ath Party.  The 
Strasbourg court interpreted the requirements of Article 5 in light of international humanitarian 
law which was applicable law in the context of the international armed conflict in Iraq. It did 
not try to fit the detention powers under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions into one of 
the grounds for non-arbitrary detention listed in Article 5(1) (a)-(f).66 Furthermore, it accepted 
that a lack of formal derogation under Article 15 did not prevent it from taking into account 
international humanitarian law when interpreting and applying Article 5.67 While internment 
in peacetime did not fall under Article 5, in the context of an international armed conflict and 
in accordance with international humanitarian law, the taking of prisoners of war and the 
detention of civilians who posed a threat to security was permitted under Article 5.68  
                                                          
62 Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1 July 1961, paras 13 and 14, Series A no. 3.   
63 See fn. 13 para. 279. 
64 L. Hill-Cawthorne, “Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and the bi-furcation of Armed Conflict” (2015) 
ICLQ 293, 324-325; C. McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) p. 334; A. Sari, 
“Derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights in Deployed Operations” Written Evidence to the 
House of Commons Defence Committee, para. 14.  (December 4, 2013) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/futureops/law10.htm [Accessed 
September 2, 2015]. 
65 See fn. 7.  
66 above para. 97. 
67 above para. 103. 
68 above para. 104. 
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The Court of Appeal acknowledged that a derogation was not required to modify Article 5 in 
an armed conflict.69 In the context of an international armed conflict, international 
humanitarian law was invoked to determine the scope and content of Article 5. However, both 
the High Court and Court of Appeal stated that because international humanitarian law did not 
provide authority for detention in NIACs, it could not be used to determine the application of 
Article 5 even if there was an alternative legal basis, and therefore applied international human 
rights law only.70 It has been argued that just because a body of law does not provide legal 
authority for a particular rule does not necessarily mean that it cannot be involved in the 
regulation of that act. Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande have pointed out that it is 
normal for bodies of law to not provide legal authority for a practice but to regulate that practice 
nonetheless.71  Ryan Goodman provides an example: “international human rights law restricts 
the grounds upon which a State may detain an individual”, however, “as a body of law, does 
not provide the source of authority to detain”.72  
There is evidence in the Court of Appeal decision that it was persuaded that international 
humanitarian law should be taken into account in determining the scope of Article 5 despite 
the fact they rejected this line of reasoning for lack of international consensus and clear legal 
authority that international humanitarian law could be taken into account in these 
circumstances. The Secretary of State had argued that, following Hassan, Article 5 could be 
modified to meet the requirements of a NIAC.73 While the Court of Appeal did not accept the 
argument because international humanitarian law had not provided a legal basis for detention, 
it proceeded to determine whether the detention conformed with “irreducible core procedural 
requirements” - devised by the Secretary of State on the grounds they were recognised by 
international humanitarian law - because the Court felt it was an important question.74 The 
Court of Appeal found that in relation to those core procedural requirements, Serdar 
Mohammed’s detention had not been reviewed by an impartial and objective authority;75 and 
                                                          
69 See fn. 1 para. 118. 
70 above para 123, para 166, para 281.  
71 L. Hill-Cawthorne and D. Akande, “Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts?” (May 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-
international-armed-conflicts/ [Accessed September 2, 2015]. 
72 See fn. 8, p. 159.  
73 See fn. 1 para. 122.  
74 above para. 282. 
75 above para. 290. 
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that he was not given an opportunity to participate in the reviews of his detention.76 This 
additional and superfluous analysis points to the fact that the Court of Appeal felt a need to 
engage in determining whether alternative and modified standards of procedural safeguards 
would be met in the circumstances, perhaps suggesting a lack of faith in the ability of the human 
rights jurisprudence alone to regulate detention in NIACs. 
UK domestic courts and legislators could draw upon the most expert policy reports on detention 
in NIACs. Gabor Rona recommends the principles and guidelines developed in the Chatham 
House Initiative77 as a good “starting point” for establishing agreement by enough States on a 
“uniform list of ‘floor’ requirements” for detention.78 The guidance provided by the Chatham 
House Initiative is not law and Rona sees it as merely constituting a “starting point” for 
establishing agreement on shared principles between states for detention in NIACs, rather than 
of evidence of agreement. However, its authoritative status and its evidence of international 
consensus amongst experts should be enough to persuade the European Court of Human Rights 
that legislation based on those standards provides for non-arbitrary detention. 
The guidance offered by the Chatham House Initiative is rudimentary but does provide basic 
principles governing detention in NIACs.  It states that probably the only permissible ground 
for internment would be for “imperative reasons of security” which it admits would be subject 
to interpretation.79 However, concrete examples of where internment is prohibited is internment 
for the sole purpose of obtaining intelligence, where the person is to be used as a “bargaining 
chip” such as in the context of hostage-taking, and internment as a method of punishment.80 
The three clear examples of where internment is prohibited can be a starting point through 
which to assess Mohammed’s detention. Although he was initially arrested as a security threat 
the Court found that his detention beyond 96 hours was predominantly for intelligence 
purposes.81 This is clearly prohibited under the Chatham House Initiative.  
                                                          
76 above para 293.  
77 See fn. 9. 
78 See fn. 9 p. 58. The Copenhagen Principles are also recommended for helping to determine the procedural 
safeguards that should be in place but do not provide recommendations for grounds of detention.  
79 See fn. 9 pp. 864-865. 
80 above p. 865. 
81 See fn. 1 para. 250.  
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The principles set out in the Chatham House Initiative constitute a detailed and thoughtful 
analysis of the relationship between international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and the law of domestic states as applied to detention in NIACs.82 Therefore, the Chatham 
House Initiative is not separate from the question of whether international humanitarian law 
should be taken into account under Article 5, but provides detailed guidance on how different 
bodies of law can contribute to regulation of detention in NIACs. 
Conclusion 
The Human Rights Act 1998 has played an indispensable role in holding the UK executive to 
account in its activity abroad. The UK High Court and Court of Appeal delivered impressive 
judgments in relation to detention in NIACs. Continued success in dealing with complex legal 
issues relating to detention in NIACs depends upon not being intimidated by the challenges 
that lie ahead.83 Denying human rights protection to individuals abroad who are affected by 
UK government activity by fully domesticating rights is not the answer. Legislative action 
needs to be taken in response to the meticulous decisions delivered by both Justice Leggatt and 
the Court of Appeal which both call for a non-arbitrary legal basis for detention in Afghanistan. 
                                                          
82 See fn. 9 p. 860. 
83 See fn. 1 para. 96.  
